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PERSPECTIVES
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of Medical Devices? The Role of Independent
Technology Assessment
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INTRODUCTION: The global medical technology indus-
try brings thousands of devices to market every year.
However, significant gaps persist in the scientific liter-
ature, in the medical device approval process, and in
the realm of postmarketing surveillance. Although
thousands of drugs obtain approval only after review
in randomized controlled trials, relatively few new
medical devices are subject to comparable scrutiny.
OBJECTIVE: To improve health outcomes, we must
enhance our scrutiny of medical devices, and, without
simply deferring to the Food and Drug Administration,
we must ask ourselves: Who is responsible for evaluat-
ing the safety and effectiveness of medical devices?
CONCLUSIONS: Technology assessments by indepen-
dent organizations are a part of the solution to this
challenge and may motivate further research focused
on patient outcomes.
KEY WORDS: medical technology; health professions; safety;
health care quality.
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INTRODUCTION
New technology has been defined as “anything that doesn’t
quite work yet.”1 While in some instances accurate, this
definition would justifiably elicit public outcry if applied to
the latest medical technology. And yet, as will be described
below, many new medical devices (i.e., “medical technology”)
make it to market without the kind of rigorous evidence
expected for drug approval. In this paper, we review the
existing process of medical device approval, and we discuss
how independent, systematic assessments of newly approved
medical devices can evaluate the extent and quality of the
evidence for medical devices, thereby supporting the safe and
effective use of emerging medical technology.
THE DRUG/DEVICE SPLIT: A HISTORICAL ARTIFACT?
Medical technology, regulated as devices, includes items as
mundane as bedpans and latex gloves, and as complex as
magnetic resonance imaging scanners and hybrid devices
such as drug-eluting stents. The explosive growth of medical
technology has paved the way for fields as disparate as organ
transplantation and preimplantation genetic diagnosis.2 By
the late 1990s, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
had approved about 500,000 medical device models produced
by approximately 23,000 different manufacturers. It has been
estimated that 4% of the population in the USA has at least 1
implanted medical device.3,4
In spite of the ubiquity and impact of emerging medical
technology, few physicians, and even fewer patients, under-
stand the process by which new medical devices are evaluated
and approved by the FDA. Although there have been some
serious and well-publicized problems (e.g., rofecoxib), the
process for evaluating pharmaceuticals before their release
into the market is much more thorough than the analogous
process for new medical devices.5–9 Whereas all new drugs
must pass rigorous premarketing approval testing with ran-
domized clinical trials, such testing is required for relatively
few new devices. Devices are defined according to the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Section 201, as “an instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro
reagent, or other similar article that is intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”3,10 This
drug/device split in testing extends throughout the health
care system to health plans and hospitals, as formulary
committees for drug coverage have few device–coverage corre-
lates. The somewhat artificial distinction between devices and
drugs is a historical and legislative artifact. In contrast, in the
UK, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE) evaluates both drugs and devices according to the same
protocol. Recently, there has been a call to address the issue in
the USAwith a “center for comparative effectiveness reviews.”11
FDA APPROVAL: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Within the FDA, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health
(CDRH) has primary responsibility for the premarket assess-
ment of new medical technology. The CDRH not only considers
the risks of new devices, but also monitors them via a
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nationwide postmarket surveillance system. New devices are
classified as low (I), moderate (II), or high risk (III). Among the
thousands of device applications submitted annually, fewer
than 100—those considered to be novel and high-risk—
undergo a premarket approval application (PMA) analogous
to the rigorous scrutiny required for new drugs.12 The bulk of
new device approval applications are instead initiated via a
premarketnotificationapplication [510(k)], anFDAprocessbased
on the assumption that most devices are essentially equivalent to
those already approved. For example, via the 510(k) pathway,
the manufacturer of an approved laser may not be required to
provide safety and efficacy data to employ a second-generation
laser for treating conditions beyond those listed in the initial
PMA approval.13 Computed tomographic (CT) colonography
(virtual colonoscopy), which received 510(k) FDA clearance in
May of 2003, exemplifies an application of CT for which
neither validity nor clinical benefit had to be demonstrated
before marketing and clinical application.14,15
This pathway to approval does not usually require clinical
data derived from randomized trials regarding the effectiveness
or safety of a device for a given use or population of
patients.3,16–18 For the fiscal year 2005, the Office of Device
Evaluation reported receiving 3,130 510(k) applications (ca. 250
per month), whereas only 43 original PMAs requiring rigorous
study were submitted.12 The 510(k) process leads to the
imprimatur “FDA approved” on many devices for which there
may be only limited data in support of clinical effectiveness or
safety for that specific clinical indication (see Fig. 1 for an
overview of the FDA approval process for medical devices).3
There are concerns about inadequate scrutiny of devices at the
FDA, resulting in part from limited resources. In fact, the FDA
issued a report stating that “medical device program resources
have been reduced in recent years, and there have been indica-
tions that review performance has begun to decline.”19 The
Institute ofMedicine (IOM) hasdescribedall of the FDAevaluation
programs as “severely underfunded,”which has led to a potential
increase in public riskand growing relianceon industry-paiduser
fees. These fees will account in 2008 for more than 40% of the
drug regulation resources and almost a quarter of the resources
needed for the review of medical devices.9,19–21 Some have
expressed concern that user fees render the FDA more account-
able to the very drug and device manufacturers it is supposed to
be regulating and that themanufacturers are replacing the public
as the FDA’s primary clients.21 In addition, the FDA has limited
ability and authority to conduct postmarketing surveillance for
both devices and pharmaceuticals; it falls on the manufacturers
and academic and clinical investigators to initiate the bulk of
recalls and failure reports.3,16,22–25 This situation leaves ample
room for those with potential and real financial conflicts of
interest to exert undue influence on the regulatory process. In a
recent initiative to reduce conflicts of interest among members
serving ondevice regulatory advisory committees, guidelineshave
been drafted that suggest an eligibility cutoff of US $50,000 as the
maximum financial interest of any potential committee member
under FDA consideration.26
Furthermore, the FDA explicitly does not regulate physician
behavior or approve particular clinical procedures.27 Once a
technology is approved, it can be used in clinical scenarios that
fall outside the patient- and clinical-inclusion criteria of the
pivotal trials. In the recent controversy over the long-term safety
of drug-eluting stents, it was revealed that up to 55% of these
devices are implanted for such “off-label” use.28,29 The stent
uproar has been said to represent “both a success and a failure”
of the FDA medical-device regulatory system: While a panel was
rapidly assembled to respond to concerns, much still remains
unknown about the long-term safety of drug-eluting stents, and
millions of these devices have already been implanted.25
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT
Recognizing that all health care sectors need to cooperate to
critically assess the available evidence to ensure the safety and
Figure 1. Overview of the Medical Device Approval Process.3
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effectiveness of medical care, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
addressed the “quality chasm” by initiating a roundtable on
evidence-based medicine based on the findings of numerous
studies showing that
... far too much of our health care spending is devoted to
activities that do not improve health, and far too little
investment is devoted to better understanding the
relative advantages among various intervention choices.
This gap in knowledge about what approaches deliver
the best results will only be compounded as the pace of
technology development quickens...30,31.
One means of addressing the problem of our lack of
information about the relative efficacy and safety of various
medical devices is to use an evidence-based medicine (EBM)
approach that encourages the uniform application of consistent
scientific methodology to inform and tailor care.32–34 EBM-
based assessments of new medical technology have the poten-
tial to enhance safety and efficacy by advocating that clinical
practice be informed by analyses of well-designed, randomized,
controlled trials optimally conducted at more than 1 center;
these features of EBM may increase transparency and reduce
opportunities for bias and conflicts of interest. However, in some
circumstances well-designed observational studies may suffice
for evaluation of diagnostic tests.35
BEYOND THE FDA: APPLYING EBM TO MEDICAL
DEVICES
Medical technology assessment may amplify conflicts of inter-
est related to investments, reimbursement for clinical services,
research support, political and lobbying influences, and other
factors affecting all stakeholders: manufacturers, stockholders,
physicians, patients, insurance carriers, and even the FDA
itself. Fortunately, several existing medical technology assess-
ment groups provide complementary critical analyses of the
efficacy and safety of new medical devices (Tables 1, 2, and 3).
Among the government-sponsored entities other than the FDA
that have contributed to the research and dissemination of
technology assessments, the most prominent is the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which often initiates
coverage of medical devices with an evidence-development
process ultimately aimed at synthesizing large amounts of data
from various clinical experiences.36 Other groups include the
IOM, the National Institutes of Health, the USPreventive Services
Task Force, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ), which itself includes a network for Developing Evidence
to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness (DeCIDE), Centers for
Education and Research on Therapeutics (CERTs), and several
evidence-based practice centers (EPCs) funded by the AHRQ that
not only review relative effectiveness and safety, but also identify
areas requiring further study. A number of foreign federal and
private technology assessment agencies (e.g., NICE in the UK)
also make important contributions.
Private Payers and Technology Assessment
Private payers rely on a mix of both proprietary and publicly
available technology assessments for their policy development;
some have their own proprietary technology assessment
process or purchase proprietary technology assessments
produced by independent, often for-profit, companies. An
example of an independent, nonprofit organization that pub-
lishes technology assessments is the Institute of Clinical
Table 1. Major Evidence-Based Sources of Information on Medical Technology
Center Website Services Comments
Food and Drug
Administration–Center for
Devices and Radiological
HealthDatabases (FDA–CDRH)
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/databases.html Full listing of medical devices in
commercial distribution by both
domestic and foreign
manufacturers, aswell asmedical
devices at various stages of
premarket approval, and those
devices which have been recalled
from the market. The
Manufacturer and User Facility
Device Experience (MAUDE)
database provides information
on reported adverse events
for individual devices.
FDA–CDRH reports are lengthy
and dense; they often do not
provide a synthesis of the data
or the information. MAUDE is
cumbersome to use. The CDRH
also assures that non-medical
radiation-emitting products
such as cell phones, lasers,
and TV sets meet radiation
safety standards
Addresses topics such as FDA approval,
use and purchase of specific medical
devices and diagnostic tests,
manufacturer contact information,
device instructions, post-approval
alterations of products, and information
about devices applied in the treatment and
diagnosis of specific diseases
Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS)
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/index_list.
asp?list_type=tech
Information on Medicare coverage
decisions including the rationale.
Often provides cost analysis
Medicare Advisory Committee
Technology Assessments:
decisions may be influenced by
political pressures, process is
not always transparent, limited
number of topics reviewed
The Cochrane Library
Health Technology
Assessment Database
http://www.mrw.interscience.wiley.com/
cochrane/cochrane_clhta_articles_fs.html
Extensive number of topics
covered. Access to assessments
from other English-speaking
countries, including Canada, UK
and Australia. Usually systematic
reviews and meta-analyses. Cost
often included in the
assessments
Reviews lengthy and do not all
use the samecriteria/standards;
many non-technology topics are
covered. Not all trial reports
are eventually published.
Reviews are referenced in the
literature, but not as primary
documents for medical
technology evaluations; thus
do not directly influence policy
Requires a subscription to access
the database, though reviews
are often available for download
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Systems Improvement (ICSI), with 56 members funded by all 6
of the health plans in Minnesota. The Blue Cross/Blue Shield
Association (BCBSA) produces technology assessments
through an EPC, the Technology Evaluation Center (TEC).
TEC assessments are available to the public at their website
and are distributed to all of the Blues plans as a common
starting point for medical policy coverage development. Tech-
nology assessment organizations, whether developed by spe-
cific payers or independent companies, variably engage
specialty societies or local physicians for their input. Payers
typically convene a committee to consider either privately or
publicly the findings of an assessment; consumers, specialists,
and practicing physicians may serve as contributors to the
assessment itself, as members of an assessment committee, or
as majority or minority voting members on a technology
assessment. There is some concern that private payers are
vulnerable to financial pressures. A pointed summary from the
2004 Consensus Conference of the American Society for
Bariatric Surgery (ASBS) suggested that insurance providers
are “unwilling to invest in expensive treatments that yield no
profits until after 4 years because 4 years is the median time
for an individual to remain with an insurance company.”37
Whether such views are substantiated, it remains important to
acknowledge the potential for vested interests.
Table 2. Selection of Technology Assessment Entities
Center Website Services Comments
Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality
(AHRQ)
http://www.ahrq.gov Focus on evidence, high
standards, and technology’s
impact on health outcomes.
Input from an expert panel;
collaboration with Kaiser
Permanente. TEC is an evidence-
based practice center (EPC)
designated by the AHRQ.
Often lengthy assessments, but
with a brief summary. Process
informs BCBS coverage
decisions. Serves clients such
as Kaiser and CMS. There is a
public route for submitting
input to AHRQ, although it
remains unclear how this input
is incorporated into the
decision-making process. 36
Technology Evaluation
Center (TEC) of the Blue
Cross–Blue Shield
Association
http://www.bcbs.com/tec/
whatistec.html
California Technology
Assessment Forum-Blue
Shield of California
Foundation (CTAF)
http://www.ctaf.org Evidence-based reviews with
expert and community input;
focus on identifying medical
technologies that will
improve health
No cost analyses. Assessments
often lengthy. Stated goal is to
educate the public, but
assessments are often
highly technical
Hayes http://www.hayesinc.com Independent, professional
reviews; consultation about
specific health technology
topics
Must subscribe in order to read
assessments
Institute of Clinical
Systems Improvement
(ICSI)
http://www.icsi.org Independent non-profit
organization funded by all
6 of the health payers
in Minnesota
Focus on health care services for
people who live and work
in the state of Minnesota and
in adjacent areas of
surrounding states
ECRI Institute http://www.ecri.org/Pages/
default.aspx
Non-profit health research
services agency that also
operates an international
medical device problem
reporting system and a journal,
Health Devices. Medical Devices
Safety Reports (MDSR)
are available
MDSR are selected and edited
such that they provide
general information.
ECRI does not serve as an
alerting service, but weekly
alerts of medical device
hazards and recalls are
available through membership
http://www.mdsr.ecri.org/
information/about.aspx
Table 3. Selection of Professional Societies
Center Web site Services Comments
American Society for Bariatric
Surgery (ASBS)
http://www.asbs.org/ Specialist panels of individuals
with experience in a particular
field are asked to weigh in on
the approval of a new device
in their field. Members and
specialist sites also provide
information about post-approval
application of new devices
Financial conflicts of interest
and/or other professional bias
must be taken into consideration,
as such conflicts could
reduce objectivity
American College of
Cardiology (ACC)
http://www.acc.org/
American Rhinologic
Society (ARS)
http://www.american-rhinologic.
org/index.phtml
American Society
for Therapeutic Radiology
and Oncology (ASTRO)
http://www.astro.org/
American College of
Physicians (ACP)
http://www.acponline.org
American Academy of Family
Physicians (AAFP)
http://www.aafp.org
American Academy of
Pediatrics (AAP)
http://www.aap.org
American Osteopathic
Association (AOA)
http://www.do-online.org
American Thoracic Society (ATS) http://www.thoracic.org
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Professional Societies
Professional societies oversee the utilization of new technolo-
gies that fall under their domain, and they frequently provide
checks and balances on other decision-making entities. Their
Web sites can serve as a forum for hotly debated, complex
topics that affect patient safety (Table 3).38,39 Indeed, profes-
sional societies have often taken the lead in endorsing
evidence-based reviews. For example, the American College of
Physicians (ACP) announced its collaboration with the Amer-
ican Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP), the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and the American Osteopathic
Association (AOA) to release joint principles for a “Patient-
Centered Medical Home,” a program in which evidence-based
medicine serves clinical decision making.40 The American
Thoracic Society (ATS) has been a strong advocate of applying
and refining standard criteria for conducting systematic
reviews with the aim of developing practice guidelines.41,42
Professional societies not only provide a format for discussion,
they also work toward improving the overall quality of debate.
However, as with other evaluative entities, they are not
immune to pressures and financial conflicts of interest that
may influence their recommendations.43,44
Two examples of professional society recommendation serve
to highlight the potential for member self-interest to influence
the evaluation of novel medical devices. In May of 2006, an
article in the lay press questioned patient testimonials on a
manufacturer’s Web site extolling a new procedure, balloon
dilation of the sinuses, a minimally invasive alternative to
sinus surgery. This challenge was officially echoed in a position
statement by the American Rhinologic Society (ARS), claiming
that in spite of FDA approval, “... the scientific literature has no
data on the technology for long-term safety, indications,
efficacy and outcomes.”45–47 What the ARS did not say is that
some of their members might experience a decline in income if
the balloon dilation procedure were established as the stan-
dard of care over surgery. Likewise, intensity-modulated
radiation therapy (IMRT), an alternative to conventional 3D-
conformal radiation therapy (3D-CRT), has been broadly
embraced by the radiation oncology professional organizations
for treatment of prostate cancer despite the lack of any
comparative studies in humans and no FDA review process
of specific applications of IMRT for prostate cancer. The
embrace of IMRT may have been in part driven by its favorable
reimbursement compared to that of standard therapies for
prostate cancer.48
The safety and effectiveness of medical devices are not yet
comprehensively evaluated by the FDA, other federal entities,
payers, or professional societies. Therefore, a stance of critical
self-analysis will remain crucial while advocating innovation.
Technology assessments by objective, independent, not-for-
profit entities are necessary so that deficiencies in the clinical
evidence and potential threats to patient safety are recognized
in a manner that counterbalances market forces driving
diffusion and demand.
A Case Study: The California Technology
Assessment Forum
The California Technology Assessment Forum (CTAF) is an
independent, nonprofit entity whose mission is to provide
transparent, objective reviews of new medical devices to better
educate the public, clinicians, and policymakers (see http://
www.ctaf.org). The CTAF reviews are intended to complement
the role played by professional societies and the FDA. Recent
topics have included full-field digital mammography for breast
cancer screening, gene expression profiling for the diagnosis of
heart transplant rejection, wireless capsule endoscopy, and
device-controlled breathing as a treatment for hypertension.
CTAF contracts with general internists at academic medical
centers to provide about 15 systematic reviews of new and
emerging medical technologies per year. Topics are selected
through a consensus process based on impact of the technol-
ogy and availability of relevant clinical data by an ad hoc
committee consisting of representatives from the CTAF panel
(see below), the generalist physician consultants and the Blue
Shield of CA health plan. Potential topics may be brought to
the attention of the committee by all potential stakeholders:
the health plan, industry, professional societies, consumer
groups, or CTAF staff. Although the subject of these reviews is
often highly specialized and technical, CTAF believes that
generalist physicians are better suited to provide objective,
evidence-based assessments than are subspecialists who, in
spite of their superior technical knowledge, may bemore likely to
have preexisting biases or opinions. Three times per year, CTAF
invites manufacturers, patients, clinicians, and payers to openly
debate the safety and effectiveness of 4 to 5 new devices; these
discussions typically include input ranging from anecdotal
patient experience to expert testimony from the principal inves-
tigators of the pivotal randomized controlled trials.
CTAF reviews are systematic analyses of the peer-reviewed
literature that synthesize the results of all published clinical
trials, case series, and randomized clinical trials, with an
emphasis on comparative trials. The MEDLINE database,
Cochrane clinical trials database, Cochrane reviews database,
and the Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE) are
searched using relevant key words from 1966 up to the
present. In addition, the bibliographies of systematic reviews
and key articles are manually searched for additional refer-
ences. Abstracts of citations are reviewed and all relevant
articles reviewed in full. Each assessment is researched and
written by the lead consultant with consultation and input
from the other consultants as needed and are, generally,
25,000 to 30,000 words in length.
The consultant must determine whether each new technol-
ogy selected for review meets 5 criteria (see Table 4) according
to a consistent, reproducible approach with a visible line of
reasoning. The technology assessment should specify critical
patient-centered outcomes, as well as identify which data are
available that will ideally evaluate these outcomes, and where
there is insufficient data. CTAF reviews are sent to subspecial-
ty experts and to professional societies for critical appraisal
and comment. Members from both of these groups are invited
to the CTAF meetings to contribute to the discussion in a
public forum. Other interested parties from the government
(e.g., CMS), health care organizations, academic centers, and
the community are also invited to attend and participate in the
discussion. Efforts are also made to invite those who are
advocates of a particular device (such as manufacturers and
inventors), as well as others who may be against it. The open
meeting is a unique feature of the CTAF assessment protocol.
The voting panel includes experts from a variety of dis-
ciplines: ethicists, consumer advocates, practicing clinicians,
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methodologists, and others. The consultants present a brief
overview of the peer-reviewed literature to the panel and then
recommend that the technology either meets or does not meet
the 5 criteria for approval. If the recommendation cannot be
accepted as stated, the panel then entertains and votes on
alternatives. Decisions are made by a simple majority vote;
consensus is not required. Approximately 25% of new tech-
nologies are approved (i.e., found to meet all 5 CTAF criteria for
efficacy and safety). There is no formal appeal process, but
technologies will be assessed again when more data become
available and frequently are approved at that time. CTAF does
not have the ability to formally track the costs or impact of new
technology it has reviewed.
LIMITATIONS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
A general limitation of technology assessment is the lack of
high-quality data derived from randomized clinical trials.
There are often no RCTs to provide an ideal level of evidence
for decision making. As described above, the 510(k) process
permits most devices to be marketed in the absence of high-
quality studies. Moreover, manufacturers, researchers, clin-
icians, and other stakeholders frequently have little incentive
to conduct the kind of studies needed to answer the most
important or relevant clinical questions. The device industry
and professional societies often exert significant influence on
which devices are evaluated and how they are used. However
critical, assessment of the evidence by these groups may be of
limited value because of real or potential conflicts of interest.
The ties to industry funding also vary among the assessment
groups listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3, and in some cases,
assessments are provided on a for-profit basis. In short, no
immunity from conflicts of interest is conferred upon any of the
stakeholders in this process.
Discrepancies between assessment groups’ conclusions
can and do occur due in part to different values used to
weight the evidence and different methodologies (e.g., CTAF
relies solely on published peer-reviewed literature only for
their reviews, whereas another group may include unpub-
lished data). However, the occasional discrepancy can stimu-
late useful debate. Perhaps more problematic is the fact that
the available evidence-based technology assessments remain
poorly disseminated. All stakeholders—physicians, patients,
policy makers, FDA advisory committee members, and man-
ufacturers—stand to benefit from better access to assess-
ments like those provided by groups such as TEC and CTAF,
and from well-designed multicenter RCTs that can inform
practice.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the proliferation, complexity, and magnitude of
impact of new and emerging medical devices, there is an
urgent need to monitor new technology ever more closely in
terms of effectiveness and safety. In spite of this need,
significant gaps persist in the scientific literature, in the
medical device approval process, and in the realm of post-
marketing surveillance. While most pharmaceuticals obtain
FDA approval only after analysis of randomized clinical trials,
relatively few new medical devices are subject to comparable
scrutiny. To improve health outcomes, we must enhance our
understanding of new medical devices and, by not simply
deferring to the FDA, support independent, evidence-based
technology assessments. However, given the current process
that allows for the vast majority of new devices to enter the
market under a 510(k), once a device is introduced and used,
the ability to eliminate inappropriate use, even with rigorous
TA, is nearly impossible. In spite of this limitation, technology
assessments by independent organizations after FDA approval
can help identify those medical technologies that are truly
beneficial and safe. Furthermore, such assessments may
motivate research designed to answer remaining questions
about emerging technologies and can serve to educate the
public and health professionals about the potential promise
and pitfalls of new technology.
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Table 4. California Technology Assessment Forum Assessment Criteria
Number Description Comments
TA 1 The technology must have final approval from
the appropriate government regulatory bodies
Approval via 510(k) process is streamlined for new devices
that are similar to older devices
TA 2 The scientific evidence must permit conclusions
concerning the effectiveness of the technology
regarding health outcomes
Range: Levels 1–5, e.g., level 1, randomized, controlled trials
powered to demonstrate clinically significant outcomes; level 5,
case series without controls
TA 3 The technology must improve net health outcomes Diagnostic tests must change management in ways that
benefit patients
TA 4 The technology must be as beneficial as any
established alternatives
It remains unclear how to evaluate diagnostic/prognostic
tests lacking a gold-standard reference
TA 5 The improvement must be attainable
outside the investigational setting
By definition, trials are conducted within an investigational
setting, and therefore this criterion implies a speculation
about potential, and not actually studied, applications
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